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ABSTRACT 
Population-centric operations force modern western democratic states to deploy both 
police and military capacities. Globalization and under-governed states have transformed 
traditional security threats; now external security threats are generated by internal factors, 
and internal security threats are generated by external factors. Military organizations 
designed to address external security threats are ill suited to deal with internal security 
threats. 
Operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq show the need for police 
expeditionary capacities to fill in for indigenous institutions following regime overthrow. 
Modern state organizations do not produce the quality and quantity of deployable police 
needed in the time required.  
States have several options for addressing their police expeditionary capacities.  
This thesis assesses the basic options with mathematical modeling of the dynamics 
between military and police organizations. The thesis describes a hybrid option with best 
organizational practices, represented by gendarmerie-type organizations. Comparing their 
characteristics with the outcomes of the modeled game demonstrates that the hybrid 
option best captures the characteristics of the Nash point as the hypothetically optimal 
objective of the arbitration process; it thus represents a suitable and sustainable 
organizational solution. The outcomes of the modeled game also suggest an arbitration 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. AUTHOR’S MOTIVES FOR STUDYING POLICE EXPEDITIONARY 
UNITS   
My first experience with a population-centric international security operation was 
in Kosovo in 2000–2001, where I served the United Nations Mission in the Kosovo 
Civilian Police (UNMIK CIVPOL) as a member of its Close Protection Unit, a part of 
UNMIK CIVPOL’s Special Operations Group (SOG). This UNMIK CIVPOL Special 
Operations Group was composed of three main operational elements.  Intelligence and 
Analysis collected and analyzed specific police intelligence, the Close Protection Unit 
provided personal security for high risk personal, including international dignitaries and 
indigenous dignitaries, and Special Team Six conducted high risk arrests, hostage rescue 
and evacuation and extraction operations.  The SOG demonstrated specific “high end 
police capabilities” as described in a RAND Corporation study on police expeditionary 
capacities for stabilization operations.1 This international civilian police organizational 
element proficiently and efficiently performed typical military tasks overseas, which 
were frequently conducted by military units in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. In 
addition to “high end police tasks,” other essential police functions like patrolling, 
investigation and emergency response were conducted in Kosovo by professional 
international police officers within UNMIK CIVPOL. Military representatives of KFOR 
played a supporting role in these operations. From the beginning, international police 
officers did not live on protected bases, but instead stayed with the local population.   
A year later, when I conducted security advance team operations for Czech 
Ministry of Defense dignitaries in Afghanistan, I saw a very different picture. Apart from 
incompetent indigenous police, during stabilization at the end of the conventional phase  
 
                                                 
1 Terrence K. Kelly et al., A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for 
Creating U.S. Capabilities. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG819.pdf (accessed April 28, 2010).  
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of the operation, I saw only international military forces; there were no international 
police at all. The same situation and the lack of international police was evident also in 
Iraq in 2003 and 2005. 
The most striking case I observed was in 2008 while visiting my unit, the Special 
Operations Group of Military Police, in Afghanistan’s Logar province. Before they 
arrived to assist with special capabilities, there was literally nobody in their area of 
operations competent to conduct operations similar to police operations.  Such operations 
are essential to a population-centric approach.  The soldiers soon found police informers 
to provide information about local “bad guys,” which resulted into several successful 
“police style” operations. These soldiers were capable of such operations because over 
half had civilian police experience. This special unit was established ad hoc when the 
Czech Ministry of Defense recognized the urgent need for paramilitary/police capabilities 
in military environments and conflict zones after September 11, 2001. The best way to 
achieve the required capabilities quickly was to transfer police officers, many with 
international experience, to establish and build the unit. This unit had the highest pace of 
operations in the Czech Armed Forces and operated successfully in every place the Czech 
Republic was involved between 2001 and 2009 (Kosovo, Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan). 
Although this group was actually a military police, its participation comprised heaviest 
combat operations of any Czech military unit since World War II, in Helmand province 
in 2007-2008. In 2007 it suffered the Czech military’s first official combat related 
casualty since World War II. The Special Operations Group was “reorganized without 
adequate replacement” in September 2009; the circumstances and the defense ministry’s 
reasons for the reorganization remains unclear. 
In comparison to the performance of other Czech units involved in the broad 
spectrum of population-centric conflict, this unit’s operational flexibility and 
contributions were so striking that I decided to dedicate my thesis to police expeditionary 
capacities in current conflicts, with a focus on the organizational aspects. 
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B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE  
There are several reasons to examine why and how modern western democratic 
states (MWDS) should organize their police expeditionary capacities. For a student of 
Irregular Warfare and Special Operations in the Naval Postgraduate School Defense 
Analysis program, it is clear that categories like Foreign Internal Defense; Law 
Enforcement; Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR); and 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence all relate directly to the police expeditionary 
capacities of MWDS. These are just a few of the “Operations, Actions and Activities that 
Comprise Irregular Warfare” identified by the United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) in its “Irregular Warfare and Security Force Assistance 
Reference Sheet” (version 1-11 Jun 08). For the year 2010, USSOCOM’s list of research 
topics also includes topics related to police expeditionary capacities as an important part 
of Irregular Warfare. Included as “priority topics” are “How to build capabilities to 
conduct local, regional, and global assessments of counterterrorist network effectiveness” 
and “Building an IW [Irregular Warfare] force of the future.” The foreword of the 
research topics list notes that 
The overarching focus of interagency research is how to best ensure the 
interagency process meets requirements for successful prosecution of the 
ongoing irregular form of war. Irregular warfare engenders much debate, 
and its concepts are strongly linked to the interagency process.”2  
The scope of this thesis is the problem territory of organizing for police 
expeditionary capacities, as within Irregular Warfare, with a focus on interagency 
processes.  The purpose of the thesis is to contribute to the MWDS’s ability to organize 
police expeditionary capacities for overseas population-centric operations by better 
framing and identification of the organizational problem territory. 
                                                 
2 USSOCOM, “Irregular Warfare and Security Force Assistance Reference Sheet” (version 1-11 Jun 
08), Joint Special Operations University, https://jsoupublic.socom.mil. (accessed May 3, 2010).  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis focuses on three research questions connected with insurgencies and 
stabilization operations in population-centric operations.  The first question involves the 
possible contributions of a specific research method to the problem of interagency 
relations and collaborations.  The second asks how interpretations of the mathematically 
modeled results can be used to frame and provide insights about the organizational 
problem that is the focus of this thesis.  The third question addresses the more specific 
problem of the organizational processes and dynamics between major sub-state 
stakeholders in building and deploying missing police capabilities.   
The specific research questions are: 
1. Can mathematical modeling using analyses based on game theory 
contribute insights for assessing an important interagency problem?  
2. How do interpretations of the outcomes of models based on game 
theory help to frame and identify the organizational problem? 
3. How can best organizational practices (identified as gendarmerie-
type of organizations) be incorporated into the problem framing and problem 
solving processes? 
D. METHODS 
The central method used in this thesis is mathematical modeling of the problem 
territory from MWDS’ perspective and from the perspectives of military organizations 
(MO) and police organizations (PO) as two major sub-state stakeholders in the process. 
In framing and analyzing the problem territory from the state’s perspective, Decision 
theory is used to frame the state’s option to task either military or police organizations to 
transform and generate required capabilities.  The problem is framed from MOs’ and 
POs’ perspectives using game theory to represent their perspectives, anticipate their 
capabilities realistically, and identify constraints, self- interest, and common interests. 
The chapter on decision theory frames the problem territory. It requires 
establishing a platform for evaluating utilities for the numerical interpretation of observed 
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variables. The validity of the utilities presented in the chapter on game theory is 
supported by arguments about the quantitative, qualitative and timing aspects of police 
expeditionary capacities derived from observations of interventions and post-
conventional operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. The model’s validity is 
supported by outcomes from another model developed to account for the perspectives of 
the major “stakeholders,” which are police organizations (Ministry of Interior or 
Homeland Security) and military organizations (Ministry of Defense or Department of 
Defense). The game theory chapter assesses the outcomes of a game played without 
communication between POs and MOs. Analysis of outcomes of the game also illustrate 
the wickedness of the problem and underline the importance of the dynamics between 
major stakeholders and the arbiter.  
E. PLAN OF THE THESIS  
Chapter II focuses on the reasons that MWDSs need police expeditionary 
capacities in the face of new types of security threats. The wickedness of this 
organizational problem is introduced, major stakeholders identified and observations 
from interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq are presented to support an argument 
about the current lack of police expeditionary capacities. 
Chapter III introduces the state’s perspective on the decision-making process with 
the use of decision theory. The state’s perspective is framed as decisions about organizing 
police expeditionary capacities through either military organizations or police 
organizations.  This chapter also provides an assessment of major sub-state stakeholders’ 
suitability to perform these tasks.   
Chapter IV analyzes ongoing dynamics between military organizations and police 
organizations using game theory. The game is modeled to reflect the dilemma faced by 
both organizations:  their common interest in delivering security vs. their organizational 
self-interest. The game’s outcomes are interpreted and explained in the context of 
common organizational practices and how they reflect a suitable and sustainable 
organizational solution mathematically captured by Nash point. This chapter requires that 
the reader understand the concepts and methods of game theory. 
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Chapter V discusses best organizational practices in the context of the outcomes 
and mathematically captured characteristics of suitable and sustainable organizational 
solutions. The hybrid organizational form is explained, and the example of gendarmerie-
type organizations is presented. The chapter emphasizes the important role of an arbiter  
representing the state level of organization. The collaborative strategy of coping with 
problems is a critical factor for overcoming bureaucratic resistance at the sub-state level 
of organization from MOs and POs. 
Chapter VI summarizes the research and provides recommendations to 
stakeholders involved in the process of organizing police expeditionary capacities, along 







II. POLICE EXPEDITIONARY CAPACITIES FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE MODERN WESTERN DEMOCRATIC 
STATE 
Chapter II focuses on the reasons that MWDSs need police expeditionary 
capacities in the face of new types of security threats. The wickedness of this 
organizational problem is introduced, major stakeholders identified and observations 
from interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq are presented to support an argument 
about the current lack of police expeditionary capacities. 
A. THE NEW CHARACTER OF SECURITY THREATS  
The organization of police expeditionary capacities by modern western 
democratic states is a wicked problem. According to Roberts, wicked problems have the 
following characteristics:  
1) There is no agreement about “the problem.” In fact, the formulation of 
the problem is the problem.  2)  There is no agreement on a solution.  In 
actuality, stakeholders put forward many competing “solutions” none of 
which have stopping rules to determine when the problem is solved.  3) 
The problem solving process is complex because constraints, such as 
resources and political ramifications, are constantly changing.  4) 
Constraints also change because they are generated by numerous 
interested parties who come and go, change their minds, fail to 
communicate, or otherwise change the rules by which the problem must be 
solved.3 
Wicked problems often lack agreement among stakeholders about the causes of the 
problem and, in some cases, even whether there is any problem to be solved. 
Stakeholders’ differing views about the problem territory make the problem identification 
and problem solving processes difficult, because, as Conclin says: “[W]hat ‘the Problem’ 
is depends on who you ask—different stake-holders have different views about what the 
problem is and what constitutes an acceptable solution.”4 
                                                 
3 Nancy Roberts, The course syllabus for her course on “Coping with wicked problems, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009. 
4 Jeff Conclin, “Wicked problems and social complexity,” CogNexus Institute, 
http://www.cognexus.org/wpf/wickedproblems.pdf (accessed May 08, 2010), 7. 
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The most important stakeholder in the process of organizing police expeditionary 
capacities is the state, which represents the highest level of decision making. The other 
two major stakeholders are represented by sub-state level military and police 
organizations. Apart from intelligence organizations, military and police organizations 
are traditionally the major stakeholders in the state’s monopoly on the legal use of force 
and the execution of state security operations.  
The claim that organizing police expeditionary capacities is a wicked problem is 
supported by the observation that there is no agreement on the need for such capacities, 
the need for a new organizational solution, or what the best organizational solution would 
be. Kelly et al. argue that there is a lack of police expeditionary capacities and that the 
situation requires a new organizational solution.5 On the other hand, Celeski says that 
U.S. military decision makers do not see such a need.6 Current organizational practices 
demonstrate that MOs tend to use military personnel to execute policing, with 
questionable results. Sullivan calls for building police expeditionary capacities for 
counterinsurgency and stabilization operations.7 Lutterbeck perceives a lack of effort to 
examine this problem, which explains the lack of available literature on the issue.8  As 
the three major stakeholders - the state, MOs and POs - express differing opinions on this 
problem.  This thesis examines their perspectives in order to provide better insights on 
this wicked problem.   
The state’s traditional purpose for having MOs and POs is to cover two basic 
categories of security threats: internal security threats and external security threats. Derek 
Lutterbeck writes,  
                                                 
5  Terrence K. Kelly, Seth G. Jones, James E. Barnett II, Keith Crane, Robert C. Davis, Carl Jensen. A 
Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for creating U.S. Capabilities. (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation,  2009),http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG819.pdf 
(accessed April 28, 2010), 1. 
6Joseph D.  Celeski, , Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN: the Thick Blue Line. The JSOU Press, 
Hurlburt Field, Florida, 2009.  
7 John P. Sullivan, The Missing Mission: Expeditionary Police for Peacekeeping and Transnational 
Stability. Small Wars Journal (May 9, 2007). http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/05/the-missing-
mission-expedition/(accessed April 29, 2010). 
8 Derek Lutterbeck, , Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of 
Gendarmeries, (Geneva: Sage Journals Online, 2004), http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/39/1/45 (accessed 
April 28, 2010),63. 
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Traditionally, security thinking and analysis have been dominated by two 
broad categories: challenges to a state’s internal security and threats to its 
external security. While internal security has been understood in terms of 
criminal or otherwise disturbing activities within the boundaries of the 
state, threats to external security have been considered to arise first and 
foremost from aggressive behavior of other states.9 
The traditional way of organizing for security used by MWDS, at least in the 
postcolonial era, is for MOs to deal with external security threats while POs deal with 
internal security threats. Modern western democratic states have developed laws and 
organizational measures to make these organizations effective and at the same time 
prevent them from abusing their special powers, their monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force.   
Figure 1 shows categories of current internal and external security threats with 
representative examples. External security threats include threats generated by state 
actors (for example, interstate nuclear or conventional conflict, state sponsored 
insurgencies and terrorism) and threats generated by internal factors (for example, non-
state actors involved in transnational terrorism, insurgencies, transnational organized 
crime). Internal security threats include domestic threats (domestic crime, insurgencies 
and terrorism) and threats generated by external factors (for example, transnational 
terrorism and organized crime).  
                                                 
9 Derek Lutterbeck, Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of 
Gendarmeries, (Geneva: Sage Journals Online, 2004), http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/39/1/45 (accessed 
April 28, 2010). 
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Figure 1.   A hierarchical categorization of security threats facing modern western 
democratic states 
Traditionally, militaries are organized to deal with external security threats, 
typically of a conventional nature, generated by state actors; police are organized to deal 
with internal security threats, typically generated by non-state actors. This security 
paradigm is reflected in the organizational design of MOs and POs. Military 
organizations are more centralized, hierarchical and formal, and less interactive with 
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civilian populations. Police organizations are flatter, with fewer vertical levels, less 
formal, and interact more with civilians. Historically, domestic and international laws put 
constraints on MOs and POs to prevent them from abusing their power. In the United 
States, the Posse Comitatus Act restricts military involvement in domestic affairs. Similar 
laws restrict POs in many ways on the national and international levels.   
Under governed or failed states, a new set of factors challenge the suitability of 
the traditional way of organizing state security. These factors include non-state actors 
with transnational ambitions, the process of globalization, the spread of new 
technologies, and the establishment of international security organizations. According to 
John Robb in The Brave New War,  
The real threat, as seen in the rapid rise of global terrorism over the past 
five years, is that this threat is not another state but rather a super-
empowered group. This group, riding on the leverage provided by rapid 
technology improvement and global integration, will remain the major 
threat to our way of life.10  
Along with these processes comes a phenomenon that can be summarized as two 
basic categories:  internal factors generating external security threats, and external factors 
generating internal security threats.   
Internal factors generate external security threats are one aspect of the new reality. 
Modern western democratic states now face threats not only from state actors, but also 
from non-state actors with transnational political or criminal objectives who operate from 
an external territory and have the capability to harm MWDS on their own territory. Al 
Qaeda’s 2001 attacks against the World Trade Center, organized from a sanctuary in 
Afghanistan, are an example.  As Birnbaum writes:  
Confronted by transnational armed groups, western democracies are tempted to 
wage pre-emptive wars. Colonomos highlights the novelty of this type of engagement. He 
goes on to explain that preventive war “reveals a change epitomized by September 11.” It 
                                                 
10 John Rob, The New Brave War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization. New 
Jersey: John Wiley&Sons, Inc., 2007, 7. 
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has come to the fore at a time of global terrorism, in a world in which “the military are 
playing at being the police,” and domestic and foreign policies have become as one.11 
A second aspect of the new reality is that external factors generate internal 
security threats. Modern western democratic states are now challenged not only by 
domestic actors, but also by transnational organized crime with financial objectives and 
by transnational non-state actors with political objectives.   
The common denominator for these two new phenomena is the presence of non-
state actors with transnational ambitions and operational capabilities. The role of non-
state actors affects the role of the population and the related role of policing. The more 
the population becomes a “center of gravity” of state security concerns and operations, 
the greater the importance of state policing capabilities.  
B. SECURITY ORGANIZATION MISMATCH  
Because of new organizational requirements and the unsuitability of the 
traditional organizational model for dealing with nontraditional security threats, there is a 
mismatch in MWDS security organizations.  On the one hand, the traditional design does 
a good job of dealing with traditional security threats; on the other hand, the traditional 
design undermines the state’s ability to deal effectively with new security threats.  
In order to deal with both traditional and new types of security threats, MOs and 
POs have to adapt. The process of adaptation means that MOs have to build population-
centric capabilities, and POs have to build enemy-centric capabilities. Examples of 
adaptation by MOs include the concept of U.S. Special Forces, the U.S. Marine Corps’ 
Combined Action Program during the Vietnam War, use of military police in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to police the civilian population, psychological operations and civilian-
military cooperation units. Adaptation results from counterinsurgency operation 
requirements, but also from the resulting response to requirements for stabilization and 
peacekeeping operations. Examples of adaptation by POs that built enemy-centric 
                                                 
11 Ariel Colonomos, “Le Pari de la Guerre”, War Confuses Police with Military, by  Jean Birnbaum, 
guardianweekly.co.uk, May 8, 2009, 
http://www.guardianweekly.co.uk/?page=editorial&id=1057&catID=17 (accessed April 29, 2010). 
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capabilities include the emergence, after the Munich Olympic Games hostage crisis in 
1972, of national police counterterrorist units like the German GSG9, Italian NOCS, 
Norwegian DELTA and Czech URN. 
The rapid removal of repressive regimes by MWDS, as in Kosovo, Afghanistan 
and Iraq, reveals a new category of organizational mismatch with the current security 
paradigm, manifested by the lack of police expeditionary capacities. The next section 
examines the lack of police expeditionary capacities in more detail. 
C. POLICE EXPEDITIONARY CAPACITIES IN MISMATCHED 
SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS 
Mismatched security organizations make it challenging to organize necessary 
policing of civilian populations in states where MWDS have intervened.  Interventions in 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate a strategic need for, and critical lack of, 
deployable professional police among MWDS. The three cases share a common 
characteristic, which is a vacuum in basic state institutions, including police institutions, 
caused by the rapid overthrow of repressive regimes by MWDS. However, the ability of 
the intervening MWDS to fill the vacuum with their own police expeditionary capacities 
differed in the three cases.  
Such security assistance is also called executive policing. Renata Dawn describes 
this relatively new security term:  
Unlike much peacekeeping jargon, executive policing is a fairly precise 
concept. It refers to the power and practice of law enforcement by 
international police within a particular territory. This power derives from 
the assumption by the UN of sovereign authority over the area (either all 
or a part of a state) and its practice from the establishment of a transitional 




                                                 
12 Renata Dwan, Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peacekeeping Operations. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002, 1. 
 14
In 1999, in the immediate post conventional phase of the invasion of Kosovo, the 
international community was able to deploy almost 5000 international police 
professionals to police a population of approximately two million inhabitants. Renata 
Dwan states,     
The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was set up 
on 10 June 1999 by UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Authority for 
training a local police force was provided in a single sentence, which also 
provided executive authority for a 4700-member UN Civilian Police Force 
(the UNMIK Police).The sentence stated, that the responsibilities of 
UNMIK would include maintain civil law and order, including 
establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of 
international police personnel to serve in Kosovo.13 [italics added for 
emphasis] 
In 2002 and 2003, during the immediate post conventional phase of the invasion 
of Afghanistan, the international community was able to deploy 17 German police 
professionals to assist in building local police capacities for a population of 
approximately 30 million inhabitants. In his article on the rise of insurgency in 
Afghanistan, Seth Jones writes, 
State-building efforts were sparse in a country that desperately needed 
law, order and institutions capable of delivering basic services. As a 
result, the reach of the government remained largely limited to the capital. 
The capacity building and formalization of the Afghan security forces, 
including the Afghan National Army, was largely neglected until the 
emergence of the insurgency. The Afghan government was also unable to 
provide security outside of the capital. A major reason was the inability of 
the U.S. government to build competent Afghan security forces, especially 
the police. The result was a weak security apparatus that could not 
establish a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within the country. The 
police were not an international priority after the overthrow of the Taliban 
regime, and they received significantly less money and attention than the 
army. The United States declined to provide significant assistance to the 
Afghan police in the aftermath of the Taliban’s overthrow, and handed 
police training over to the Germans. By 2003, however, U.S. officials at 
the State Department, Defense Department, and White House began to 
argue that the German effort was far too slow, trained too few police 
                                                 
13 Renata Dwan, Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peacekeeping Operations. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002, 86. 
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officers, and was seriously underfunded. German assessments of progress 
in rebuilding the police noted that 17 German police officers—men and 
women from both our federal and state police forces—are advising the 
Afghan Transitional Authority on this challenging task of crucial 
importance for the country’s democratic future. The low level of 
resources, however, demonstrated that the Germans were not serious about 
police training.14 [italics added for emphasis]   
During the immediate post conventional phase of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 
international community was able to deploy only military units. Of these, military police 
units could only partly meet the serious need for local security among a population of 
approximately 30 million.  Policing of the civilian population of Iraq was characterized 
by chaos and incompetence.  Mathieu Deflem says, 
Initially most striking was the general lawlessness that erupted in Baghdad 
after the invasion of the city. Some of this violence damaged the police 
infrastructure, later contributing to impede the rebuilding of the civilian 
forces. Also, at the time lawlessness had erupted, most Iraqi police and 
military had simply gone home. Although U.S. officials had been informed 
about the likely breakdown of law and order in post-war situations, 
military command did not count on continued unrest after the cessation of 
major combat operations. The U.S. military appealed to Iraqi police to 
return to work, and although they were not allowed to carry weapons, 
many Iraqi police soon reported back to their stations.  On April 14, 2003, 
joint patrols of Iraqi police and U.S. soldiers were first spotted in the 
streets of the Iraqi capital. But the initial police presence produced 
considerable outrage among Iraqi citizens, as many of them were thought 
to be leftovers from the Ba’athist regime. That there was some truth to this 
perception was most clearly shown in May 2003 when Zuhair al-Naimi, a 
Ba’athist loyalist and interior ministry official under Saddam Hussein, was 
appointed as the new police chief in Baghdad. Al-Naimi was forced to 
resign within a week because he refused to implement the new police 
procedures suggested by the United States.15  [italics added for emphasis] 
The inability of military police to police a civilian population without preparation 
for the task is illustrated by the experience of a law professor visiting Iraq in 2003. 
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A law professor’s visit to an Iraqi police station in Baghdad in August 
2003 illustrates well the kind of difficulties confronting the reorganization 
of Iraqi police. Dropping in unannounced in a Baghdad police station, she 
found American military police, most of them between 18 and 20 years 
old, and Iraqi police just sitting around, sweltering in the 130-degree heat. 
The young American lieutenant in charge summed up the situation 
succinctly: “There’s no rule of law here... These Iraqis are all corrupt. 
They don’t know what they’re doing. They just beat suspects to get 
confessions out of them. They take bribes... They don’t understand 
anything about law. There’s never going to be law here in a million 
years.16 [italics added for emphasis] 
Although the situation was similar in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 
incompetence of indigenous POs was predictable, the intervening powers did not handle 
these situations in the same manner in terms of the quantity, quality, and timing of 
deployed security personal. The following data describes the quantitative requirements 
for policing civilian populations: 
It turns out that the number of "world policemen" required is roughly 
proportional to the size of the population being protected or controlled. At 
the low end of the scale is the proportion of police officers required for 
day-to-day law enforcement duties among generally peaceful populations 
such as those in the United States. Peaceful populations require force 
ratios of somewhere between 1 and 4 police officers per 1000 residents. 
The United States as a whole has about 2.3 sworn police officers per 1000 
residents. Larger cities tend to have higher ratios of police to population.17  
[italics added for emphasis] 
This thesis asserts that deployment of the quality and quantity of international 
police officers needed within the critical period contributed significantly to the 
prevention of insurgency (PREIN) in the case of Kosovo. In contrast, the failure of 
MWDS to deploy the necessary quality and quantity of international police officers in a 
timely fashion in Afghanistan and Iraq was a significant contributing factor in the 
development and growth of their insurgencies.  
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The argument that police expeditionary capacities for such operations are resource 
intensive and pose an actual organizational challenge support the comments by Dwan on 
executive policing.   
The second reason why there have been so few instances of executive 
policing is its feasibility. …  The responsibility requires significant 
numbers of international police personnel with wide-ranging skills and 
experience. Such personnel are already in short supply in many Western 
states and, given the increasing dominance of crime and public order 
issues in domestic politics in Europe and North America, in demand in 
their home countries. The personal and financial implications of executive 
policing for international institutions and contributing states are therefore 
domestic as well as international political issues. Only in exceptional, 
emergency situations will states be convinced that it is in their interest to 
submit their own domestic order to further pressure in order to take on the 
burdens of the order of another state. This points to a second key element 
of the concept of executive policing: it is temporary, short-term measure 
taken by the international community to plug a serious domestic security 
gap.18 [italics added for emphasis] 
Decision making to organize police expeditionary capacities requires considering 
situational requirements (quality, quantity and time availability) and factors like financial 
and human resources and international and domestic law. Probably most importantly, the 
state has to decide which of the two major sub-state organizations, MOs or POs, is best to 
be tasked with building these capacities. To make the decision most likely to create an 
appropriate and sustainable organizational solution, the state needs to understand the 
perspectives of these two organizations.  Terrence Kelly et al., in their study of 
stabilization police forces for the U.S., offer the following summary.   
There are several possible downsides. First, building a competent SPF 
would cost money, and would require taking money from elsewhere in the 
U.S. government. Second, establishing an SPF would likely trigger 
bureaucratic resistance. Creating the SPF in any agency will create 
competition for authorities and funding. Third, staffing an SPF using the 
hybrid option outlined [elsewhere in the study] could pose challenges. For 
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example, local police agencies might resist losing key police officers and 
units, such as SWAT teams.19 [italics added for emphasis] 
These concerns seem legitimate and reflect the ongoing dynamics between state 
and sub-state organizational levels. The next chapter examines these dynamics 
theoretically using the methods of mathematical modeling, and offers an interpretation of 
the outcomes to frame a subsequent discussion of organizational implications.  
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III. MATHEMATICALLY MODELING THE STATE AND MAJOR 
STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES  
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter introduces the state’s perspective on the decision-making process 
with the use of decision theory. The state’s perspective is framed as decisions about 
organizing police expeditionary capacities through either military organizations or police 
organizations.  This chapter also provides an assessment of major sub-state stakeholders’ 
suitability to perform these tasks.   
Mathematical modeling is the main method used in this thesis to conceptualize 
how to organize the MWDSs’ police expeditionary capacities.  The outcomes of the 
modeling suggest guidelines that might be useful to strategic decision makers for 
resourcing and organizing police expeditionary capacities. 
Chapter II describes why MWDSs need police expeditionary capacities, the 
traditional way of organizing to deal with security threats, and the major stakeholders 
involved in this process. The thesis now turns to framing the perspectives of three major 
stakeholders:  the state, military organizations, and police organizations.  
The perspective of the state’s executive power is examined in this chapter using 
decision theory. Game theory is used to analyze the dynamics between MOs and POs. 
The outcomes of these games are analyzed and interpreted, and recommendations 
offered. The recommendations are then further examined using decision theory to model 
the final decision-making process from the state’s perspective.    
B. MODELING THE STATE PERSPECTIVE ON THE TRADITIONAL 
TWO ORGANIZATION OPTION WITH DECISION THEORY 
 This section builds on the assumption that MWDSs should organize their police 
expeditionary capacities to deal more effectively with internal factors that generate 
external security threats. Decision theory is one of “lenses” through which the state can 
view the problem territory.  
 20
Decision theory, which is also called decision analysis, is a collection of 
mathematical models and tools developed in the twenties century to assist 
people in choosing among alternative actions in complex situations. In 
many cases the options we have are clearly defined and we also know the 
collection of consequences that may eventually occur, but we are 
uncertain exactly which of these outcomes will happen. Between the 
moment we act and the time the process concludes, there may be other 
forces affecting the action, forces over which we have no control. We 
may, however have some information about the relative like hood of each 
outcome flowing from each action.”20 [italics added for emphasis] 
In the traditional way of organizing security capacities, the state has only two options: (1) 
rely on MOs, tasking them to build police expeditionary capacities; or (2) rely on POs, 
tasking them to build or provide police expeditionary capacities. Each of these options 
has a different probability of success, represented by outcomes. 
Each of the state’s options, (1) Task MOs and (2) Task POs, has two possible 
outcomes: 
1. One outcome is an effective and sustainable organizational solution that 
contributes significantly to counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, to the prevention of 
insurgencies (PREIN) efforts, and to the prevention of terrorist attacks on the state’s own 
soil (see Figure 2).   
2. The second outcome is an ineffective or unsustainable organizational solution 
that undermines the state’s PREIN and COIN efforts and also fails to decrease the 
potential for terrorist attacks on the state’s own soil.  
The states two possible options and two possible outcomes, generates four 
possible action outcomes: action outcome #1 (task MOs – MOs succeed), action outcome 
#2 (task MOs – MOs fail), action outcome #3 (task POs – POs succeed), action outcome 
#4 (task POs – POs fail). These two state options combine with the two outcomes to 
generate four action outcomes as illustrated in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2.   The state’s perspective represented as a decision tree with two options (MOs 
versus POs) and two outcomes (success versus failure) for each option. 
To evaluate the four action outcomes, it is necessary to estimate their 
probabilities.  
One guiding principle is always present: Determine as best as you can the 
probabilities at every stage for the various outcomes as well as the value, 
or utility, of these outcomes; once you have done this calculate the 
expected utility of each course of action and consider the strategy that 
yields the largest expected utility.21 [emphasis in the original] 
The determination of probabilities in this thesis reflect the author’s judgment,   supported 
by assessments of (a) knowledge, skills, and abilities, (b) organizational resources, 
including financial and human resources, and (c) organizational motives and incentives.  
Here the strengths and the weaknesses represent current positive and negative aspects 
(pros and cons) of organizing police expeditionary capacities as illustrated in Figure 3.  
Opportunities and barriers represent positive and negative potentials (pros and cons) for 
organizing police expeditionary capacities. All modified categories are structured as 
branches of positive aspects (pros) and negative aspects (cons) and further as branches of 
already existing potential (present) and  future potential (future) for organizing police 
expeditionary capacities. 
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ACTION  OUTCOME #1





Figure 3.   Structure of analysis using PROS and CONS with respect to strengths and 
future opportunities and weaknesses and future barriers for organizing police 
expeditionary capacities 
In the next sections of this chapter, assessments of present weaknesses of MOs 
and POs are compared and further used as a basis for assessing future opportunities in 
terms of their organizational potentials to overcome their present weaknesses. 
Assessments of future opportunities of MOs and POs are also compared and serve as a 
basis for assessments of future barriers in terms of their potential to overcome present 
weaknesses with use of future opportunities. The structure and flow of this assessment is 




























Identify PROS Identify CONS 
In the context of the 
Present situation 
With respect to 
future potential 
In the context of the 
present situation 
With respect to 
future potential 
What are the 
organizations’ 
current strengths? 
What are the future 
opportunities of the 
organization to take 
advantage of these 
strengths? 
What are the 
organization’s 
current weaknesses? 





These questions are addressed in the subsequent sections of this chapter: 
 
Section C: Assessing Organizational Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities 
Section D:  Assessing Organizational Resources  
Section E:  Assessing Organizational Incentives and Motivations 
Table 1.   A flow diagram of the author’s assessments of the pros and cons with respect to 
the strengths and future opportunities and weaknesses and future barriers 
C. ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONS’ KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND 
ABILITIES 
Although organizations may have incentives and resources, knowledge, skills, and 
abilities (KSAs) are necessary if they are to execute actions effectively.  Failure to 
develop KSAs could result from a lack of opportunity to develop police expeditionary 
functions such as logistical support, combat skills, foreign languages skills and cultural 
awareness. Some knowledge can be acquired through education and training, but some 
requires on-the-job training, mentoring and real-life experience. These latter experiences 
are often difficult to acquire.  
An assessment of this category is very important for estimating the probabilities 
of success or failure in deciding whether to task MOs or POs.  Kelly et al. state that,  
Establishing security ultimately requires a combination of both military 
and policing efforts. SPF-like police forces are critical in conducting 






crowd and riot control, and training and mentoring indigenous high-end 
police. Police performed these tasks better than soldiers.22  [italics added 
for emphasis] 
In terms of the quality of KSAs, POs of MWDS have the potential to provide the 
broadest spectrum of police functions for police operations overseas.  In contrast, MOs 
can perform a very limited spectrum of functions to protect critical infrastructure and 
people.  They are likely to produce a quick reaction force (in terms of combat support); 
SWAT (of questionable quality); patrolling; traffic control; and less serious forms of 
criminal investigation of limited quality compared to the potential of POs.  Probably the 
best equipped MO components for policing the civilian population are the military police 
(MP). Even so, the potential of MPs is limited in regard to their competency to deal with 
serious organized crime, violent gangs, transnational organized crime, high standard 
SWAT, crowd and riot control, and community policing functions. Military police are 
organized and equipped to police a rather homogeneous military community with lower 
levels of serious organized crime and violence. According to Kelly et al., 
[T]he major challenges for an MP SPF would be those of carrying out the 
principal tasks of an SPF: high-end law enforcement tasks. … [D]espite 
recent MP experiences in Iraq, the U.S. experience in a range of stability 
operations—such as Haiti, Somalia, and Iraq—indicates that the military 
has struggled to perform civilian policing tasks and train foreign police 
over the past two decades.23 [italics added for emphasis] 
MOs are not likely to attain the required quantity and quality of KSAs because these are 
more than a matter of good selection, education and training. They require on-the-job 
training and real-life experience. Experience, including experience in countering serious 
organized criminal groups, requires actually policing civilian populations.   In the U.S., 
the Posse Commitatus Act restricts its MOs from such internal policing activities.  Legal  
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changes could eliminate such constraints, but the state would then risk a concentration of 
executive power in one institution that could undermine the democratic principle of the 
separation of power.   
Military organizations are much better equipped than POs in logistic support and 
air ops capabilities. However, the weighting factor of this sub-aspect should not be 
considered significant, because MOs can be tasked to support police expeditionary 
capacities without being incorporated into the police expeditionary capacities.  
Military organizations are much more capable than POs in combat skills, survival skills 
and the ability to operate in hostile environments.  This factor’s weight also should not be 
considered significant, because MOs can be tasked to support police expeditionary 
capacities.  Furthermore, POs can increase their potential to operate and survive in hostile 
environments through training activities within their own state territory prior to 
deployment.  Whether POs have the skills required to operate and survive in hostile 
environments is questionable; the answer depends of the extent of support provided by 
MOs.  However, POs should never be expected to acquire knowledge and combat skills 
at the level of high standard SWAT units or VIP security units.   
Military organizations usually have better assets, including educational facilities, 
personnel and budgets.  They also usually have more time than police organizations to 
improve language skills and cultural awareness. However, the weighting factor of this 
component should not be considered significant, because MOs’ assets can be used for 
education and training of police expeditionary capacities. Furthermore, POs can build 
these skills thorough educational and training activities within their own state territory 
and prior to deployment.   
D. ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES  
An organization might have KSAs, incentives and motivation, but lack the 
resources, and particularly the financial and legal resources, to create more resources.  
Resources may be impacted by legal and legislative constraints.  
Military organizations and POs of necessity compete for state financial resources 
spent on security. Both organizations need financing to recruit, select and develop human 
resources and to perform their tasks well; thus they compete for the maximum budget.  
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Military organizations typically have more financial resources; they also require financial 
reserves to prepare for “what if” scenarios. In contrast, POs usually struggle with 
financial resources, and states tend to allocate only what is necessary to maintain an 
equilibrium between the internal security threats and the PO’s capabilities. 
Human resources depend on financial resources, perhaps more so for POs. 
Greater financial resources allow POs to select more highly qualified personal. As long as 
existing legal constraints block MOs from conducting police tasks among their domestic 
civilian populations, more financial resources for MOs will not necessarily produce the 
required standards of human resources through selection and training. 
 The most significant constraints for MOs in terms of acquiring necessary 
knowledge and skills for policing civilian populations are the legal constraints. As 
reflected in the Posse Comitatus Act and various laws in most MWDS, the principles of 
democratic governance seem to require measures to prevent the concentration of coercive 
power within one or a few state institutions.  
E. ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL INCENTIVES AND MOTIVATIONS 
An organization might have the KSAs and the resources, but lack the appropriate 
incentives or motivations for action.  Poor incentives might be due to managers’ or 
commanders’ lack motivation.  The common denominator of both military and police 
organizations in terms of their motives to build police expeditionary capacities is their 
interest in homeland security. Members and managers of both organizations share a 
common interest in their own security and the security of close associates who live in 
their own state territory. However, they also have personal and organizational interests 
that might conflict with their shared interest in homeland security.  
The perspective of MO managers is characterized by their interest in command 
and control and in a sort of monopoly over operations overseas and dealing with external 
security threats. This characterization is based on the assumption that any organization 
wants to maintain or expand its importance and sphere of influence in order to command 
a maximum budget.  
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In contrast, apart from their interest in homeland security, managers of POs have 
little or no motivation to allocate human resources for operations overseas. They already 
struggle with human resources for internal security tasks and various international police 
functions (for instance, liaison officers for INTERPOL and other international police 
activities). Their primary task is dealing with internal security threats and, generally 
speaking, POs are short on human resources.24   
For example, the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic had to be pushed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to allocate even a small quantity of human resources 
for deployment in Kosovo as part of the United Nations Civilian Police (UN CIVPOL) in 
1999 and 2000. At the top management level, the Ministry of the Interior agreed to 
allocate those human resources, but the process was resisted almost all the way down the 
PO command structure.  Distribution of information about the opportunity to volunteer 
for UN CIVPOL missions was sabotaged by human resources departments in the various 
police sub-organizations, so information about the UN CIVPOL opportunity was spread 
predominantly by informal networks of police officers. 25  
Theoretically, there might be PO top managers who see a PO’s overseas policing 
experience as contributing to the prevention of internal threats generated by external 
factors. Whether such a view would prevail over organizational self-interest is highly 
speculative. The author here characterizes POs’ management as having a conflict of 
interest that significantly undermines the potential of POs to organize police 
expeditionary capacities. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
 The main advantages of tasking MOs to build their police expeditionary 
capacities are the MOs’ strong incentives to deal with external security threats; their 
abilities to operate overseas with their current logistical and combat capabilities; and their 
control of large budgetary allocations from the state for external security threats.  
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The main disadvantages of MOs are their low potential to acquire a requisite level 
of the quality police knowledge and skills that require experience interacting with a 
civilian population. Overcoming this problem would require significant legal changes 
that could undermine democratic principles. 
The main advantages of tasking POs to build police expeditionary capacities is 
that POs have the requisite level of police knowledge and skills.  
The main disadvantages of POs are that they lack incentives and motivation to 
devote the effort and especially the human resources to the task. To overcome this 
shortfall, extra financial resources would have to be allocated.  However, this is unlikely 
to overcome PO management reluctance to allocate their human resources for overseas 
operations. The PO management wants instead to keep the police in their territory to 
perform the organization’s primary tasks. In addition, POs lack logistical capabilities, 
combat skills, language and cultural awareness skills. The lack of KSAs is easier to 
overcome than the incentive problems, as the former can be acquired by education and 
training and with MO support and collaboration.  
In both organizations, the phenomenon of collaboration is a very complicated part 
of the wicked problem territory.  Collaboration is examined further in the models 
described in the next chapter.  
In summary, this assessment suggests that the suitability and sustainability of an 
organizational solution might depend on the ongoing dynamics between MOs and POs in 
terms of their interests, concerns and perspectives. A better understanding of these 
dynamics should be a major concern of decision makers on the state level. To better 
understand the ongoing dynamics, the thesis turns to the methods of game theory and the 
perspectives of MOs and POs framed as mathematical games. In the next chapter, 
analysis and interpretation of game models serve as the final source of information for 
suggestions to decision makers looking at the problem space through the lens of decision 
theory. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS PERSPECTIVES 
USING GAME THEORY: “PROTECTORS’ DILEMMA” 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Chapter IV analyzes ongoing dynamics between military organizations and police 
organizations using game theory. The game is modeled to reflect the dilemma faced by 
both organizations:  their common interest in delivering security vs. their organizational 
self-interest. The game’s outcomes are interpreted and explained in the context of 
common organizational practices and how they reflect a suitable and sustainable 
organizational solution, which is mathematically captured by Nash point.  
This chapter requires that readers be familiar with the concept and methods of 
game theory. Game theory provides an analytical method for examining the dynamics 
between major sub-state stakeholders (players) who can simultaneously compete, 
cooperate, or both compete and cooperate to generate organizational solutions. It also 
provides information about which of the players’ main strategies are more rational and 
why. According to the Consortium of Mathematics and its Applications a conflict arises 
whenever two or more individuals, with different values, compete to try to control events. 
Game theory uses mathematical tools to study situations involving both conflict and 
cooperation.26 In the modeled game presented in this thesis, players’ conflicts of interest 
are examined. Players share a common interest in the security of their homeland; this 
common interest, however, conflicts with their differing organizational interests.  
The analysis and interpretation of the outcomes of the modeled game serve as 
supporting information within the decision-making process. The validity and usefulness 
of such suggestions are limited by the author’s ability to capture the examined problem 
territory. Capturing a problem territory with a game theory model depends mainly on 
determining the players’ standpoints and preferences, their main strategies, and the 
ordinal values and outcomes of combining their main strategies.  
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The players in a game, who may be people, organizations, or even 
countries, choose from a list of options available to them—that is, courses 
of actions they might take—that are called strategies. The strategies 
chosen by the players lead to outcomes, which describe the consequences 
of their choices. We assume that players have preferences for the 
outcomes: they like some more than others.27 
The general structure of the author’s estimates are described in the previous 
chapter. In this chapter, numerical and graphical outcomes of the modeled game are 
further analyzed using game theory. These outcomes are interpreted in the context of the 
problem territory. Conclusions derived from these interpretations are used to frame 
recommendations on the organizational aspects of police expeditionary capacities.  
B. DETERMINATION OF PLAYERS 
The game is modeled as a game played between two players: military 
organizations and police organizations. These two players represent major sub-state 
stakeholders in the process of organizing and deploying police expeditionary capacities. 
The sub-state stakeholders share a common interest in the security of their homeland that 
reflects part of their private and organizational interests. They also have different 
organizational self-interests that conflict with their common interest in homeland 
security. This conflict of interest is elaborated in the following discussion of the players’ 
standpoints and preferences.  
C. PLAYERS’ STANDPOINTS AND PREFERENCES 
 Player’s standpoints and preferences reflect conclusions derived from their 
evaluation of the pros and cons from a decision theory perspective (the state’s 
perspective). The qualitative assessment in the previous analysis points to the most 
important pros and cons, and to the potential for conflicting interests, summarized as the 
standpoints that shape the players’ basic assumptions in the modeled game.  
                                                 
27 Consortium of Mathematics and its Applications. Principles and Practice of Mathematics. 
Springer-Verlag, New York, 1997, 467. 
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The MOs’ standpoint is characterized by a tendency to keep their financial 
resources and their monopoly over security operations overseas under their command and 
control. Military organizations recognize external security threats generated by internal 
factors, and they understand their own limits in producing the required quality of 
expeditionary police capacities. Military organizations would also appreciate POs 
allocating some of their human resources for overseas operations that would fall under 
the MOs’ command, control and budgetary authority for dealing with external threats. 
Military organizations understand that they have significant constraints in terms of 
acquiring the required level of police quality within their organizations. They might be 
able to build police capacities of the required quality if the state were to change its laws 
so they could gain experience by policing civilian population within their own countries.  
The POs’ standpoint is characterized by a tendency to reserve their human 
resources and financial resources for their primary task, which is dealing with internal 
security threats. Police organizations, overwhelmed by their own internal security 
agenda, want to keep their human resources so they do not fail in their primary task. 
Police organizations also understand that MOs need assistance with overseas policing in 
the form of some valuable PO human resources. Police organizations understand the 
relationship between external security threats generated by internal factors and internal 
security threats generated by external factors. Police organizations could provide more 
human resources or build new organizations for expeditionary policing if MOs would 
share some of their financial resources and access to their educational institutions.  
Both players know that only POs can provide the required level of quality for 
expeditionary police, as MOs cannot under current law conduct complex police tasks in 
their own countries. Both players also recognize that the state can expedite their pursuit 
of quality human resources to police civilians overseas. 
To reflect these standpoints, a partial sum game without communication is 
modeled. The game, called “Protectors’ Dilemma,” models a situation prior to the state’s 
decision about a suitable and sustainable organizational solution for police expeditionary 
capacities. The hypothetical negotiation table reflects the state’s decision-making process 
by arbitration initiative in terms of a suitable and sustainable organizational solution. 
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The game assumes that both players are rational and value their common interest 
in the security of their homeland more than they value their own organizational self-
interest.  They thus have a prevailing motivation in their common interests in homeland 
security, which means that both players understand the relation between internally 
generated external security threats (terrorism, insurgencies, crime within other states) and 
externally generated internal security threats (transnational terrorism and criminal groups 
using weak and failed states as sanctuaries). The game also assumes that both players 
understand how MOs are limited in building their own quality police expeditionary 
capacities. The players’ organizational self-interests are also considered; these play a 
significant role in the evaluation of the outcomes of the modeled game. The players’ 
dilemma reflects the conflict between their common interest and their organizational self- 
interest.  
D. PLAYERS’ STRATEGIES 
Each player has two main strategies reflecting their standpoints. Police 
organizations can use either A-strategy or B-strategy, while MOs can use either C- 
strategy or D-strategy. Combining one player’s two strategies with the two strategies of 
the other player generates four possible outcomes for each player.    
The PO’s A-strategy and B-strategy are described as follows: 
A-strategy: Provide valuable human resources. This represents the prevailing 
motivation to achieve the common interest in homeland security by providing the PO’s 
human resources for use in operations overseas. It also reflects the will of POs to risk 
shortfalls in the human and financial resources used for their primary task (dealing with 
internal security threats).  
B-strategy: Resist providing valuable human resources. This represents the 
prevailing motivation of organization self-interest in their primary task of dealing with 
internal security threats. It also reflects their lack of faith that internal security threats 
generated by external factors would decrease if POs provide their own resources to help 
deal with external security threats generated by internal factors. 
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The MO’s C-strategy and D-strategy are described as follows: 
C-strategy: Share financial resources and other assets (educational and training 
institutions) and give up part of their status and monopoly on security operations 
overseas. This represents the prevailing motivation to support the common interest by 
sacrificing some financial resources for dealing with external security threats, and 
accepting a decline in the status of the organization. 
D-strategy: Resist sharing financial resources and other assets (educational and 
training institutions) and protect their monopoly on security operations overseas. This 
represents the prevailing motivation of organizational self-interest; the risks are that 
conflicts will be protracted and that there will be a negative impact on internal security 
because external factors generate internal security threats. 
1. Combination of Strategies and Their Outcomes 
Combining each player’s two strategies with the two strategies of the other player 
generates four different outcomes for each player. The POs’ A-strategy when combined 
with MOs’ C-strategy and D-strategy provides two different outcomes (AC-outcome and 
AD-outcome). The POs’ B-strategy when combined with MOs’ C-strategy and MOs’ D-
strategy also provides two outcomes (BC-outcome and BD-outcome).  
 
  MO’s MO’s 
  C-strategy D-strategy 
PO’s A-strategy AC AD 
PO’s B-strategy BC BD 
Table 2.   Table of outcomes 
The evaluation of outcomes reflects players’ opinions on whether a common 
interest in their homeland security would be achieved, and whether their own and the 
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other player’s organizational self-interests would be achieved or harmed. Numerical 
interpretations of these outcomes are provided in the following section. 
E. PLAYERS’ ORDINAL VALUES OF OUTCOMES 
The numerical interpretation of the outcomes is represented by an ordinal scale of 
natural numbers from one to four (1, 2, 3, 4) with one representing the worst possible 
outcome and four representing the best possible outcome. These ordinal values reflect the 
author’s personal judgment. Tables 3 and 4 show the ordinal values from each of player’s 
perspective.  
 
Outcomes Ordinal value Explanation 
 
AC 4 - the best PROS: common interest met; human resources sacrificed 
but loss is compensated with financial resources sacrificed 
by MOs 
 
AD 3 - the second 
best 
 
PROS: common interest met 
CONS: human resources sacrificed  and no resources are 
sacrificed by MOs which means no compensation 
 
BC 1 -  the worst CONS: common interest not met; extra resources obtained 
because MOs sacrifice their financial resources 
 
BD 2 - the second 
worst 
CONS: no extra resources obtained 
PROS: common interest partly met 
 
Table 3.   Ordinal values assigned to represent the POs’ perspectives on the possible 
outcomes of the four strategy combinations 
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Outcomes Ordinal value Explanation 
 
AC 3 - the second 
best outcome 
PROS: common interest met 
CONS: sacrifice resources and monopoly status 
 
AD 4 - the best 
outcome 
PROS: common interest met and nothing sacrificed 
CONS: neither resources or monopoly status sacrificed  
 
BC 1 - the worst 
outcome 
CONS: common interest not met; sacrifice  resources 
without reciprocity from POs 
  
BD 2 -  the second 
worst 
outcome 
CONS: common interest not met 
PROS: neither resources neither monopoly status sacrificed 
 
Table 4.   Ordinal values assigned to represent the MOs’ perspectives on the possible 
outcomes of the four strategy combinations 
As Table 3 shows, the best outcome from the PO perspective is the AC- outcome. 
This outcome reflects satisfaction with the potential to achieve the common interest in 
homeland security and with the other player’s decision to share financial and educational 
assets. The POs do not lose much, because their loss of human resources will  
be compensated with financial resources that will allow them to acquire more human 
resources. In addition, POs can see the potential for a decrease in internal threats 
generated by external factors. 
As Table 4 shows, the best outcome from the MO perspective is the AD-outcome. 
This outcome reflects satisfaction with getting the desired human resources from POs 
without paying the price of sharing MO financial resources and educational assets or 
relinquishing MO monopoly on overseas operations.  
Table 3 shows that the second best outcome from the PO perspective is the AD-
outcome. This outcome reflects satisfaction from the potential to achieve the common 
interest in homeland security and from the other player’s decision to share resources. The 
POs suffer an uncompensated loss of the human resources they provide for overseas 
operations, but POs can see the potential decrease in internal threats generated by 
external factors. 
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Table 4 shows that the second best outcome from the MO perspective is the AC-
outcome. This outcome reflects satisfaction from the potential to achieve the common 
interest in homeland security.  They lose some financial resources, share their own 
educational assets, and give up their monopoly on overseas operations. 
The second worst outcome from the PO perspective is BD (Table 3). This 
outcome reflects dissatisfaction because the common interest in homeland security would 
not be met, but at least MOs would not sacrifice their resources and unity of command 
and control. The POs would not participate and resist the process, as POs do not want to 
undermine MO capabilities. 
The second worst outcome from the MO perspective is the BD-outcome (Table 
4).  The common interest would not be met, because the PO resists providing human 
resources, but MOs would not sacrifice their own financial resources. Thus, the BD-
outcome would not undermine the MO ability to deal with external threats generated by 
internal factors using their own (perhaps limited) capacities. 
Table 3 shows that the worst outcome from the PO perspective is the BC- 
outcome, because the common interest in homeland security would not be met and the 
MOs’ allocation of some financial resources would undermine their capability to deal 
with external security threats generated by internal factors.  
The worst outcome from the MO perspective, shown in Table 4, is the BC-
outcome, because the common interest would not be met and MOs’ allocation of some 
financial resources would undermine MO capability to deal with external security threats 
generated by internal factors.  
  
MO’s 
C - STRATEGY 
 
MO’s 
D - STRATEGY 
 PO’s        A - STRATEGY 4 , 3 3 , 4 
 PO’s        B - STRATEGY 1 , 1 2 , 2 
Table 5.   Ordinals values of both players reflecting author’s personal judgment in the 
matrix  
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F. ANALYSIS OF OUTCOMES 
This section analyzes the outcomes of the modeled game using established game 
theory methods:  matrix analysis, graph analysis, and an analysis of strategic moves. 
1. Matrix Analysis 
The matrix analysis indicates whether the modeled games have a dominant 
strategy and a Nash equilibrium.  
 
     
 MO’s 
C – STRATEGY 
Common interest
MO’s 
D – STRATEGY 
Self interest 
  
PO’s A – STRATEGY 
Common interest 
   4,  3 3,  4 3 Maxi-min 
     
PO’s B – STRATEGY 
Self interest 
   1,  1 2,  2 2  
         1      2   
  Maxi-min   
Table 6.   Analysis of modeled game matrix 
This modeled game has a Nash equilibrium represented by the combination of AD 
strategies with outcome: 3, 4. The players’ dominant strategy is represented also by the 
combination of AD strategies with outcome: 3, 4.  The likely outcome of the game is  3, 
4.  Thus, the most likely outcome of the game without communication is AD: 3, 4. 
However, game theory also offers a method to examine the likely outcome when the 
game is played with communication or when there is potential for arbitration. 
2. Graph Analysis 
Graph analysis provides information about the players’ Pareto optimal line and 




Figure 4.   Graph analysis 
The players’ security levels, Pareto line, Pareto optimal, and Nash point28 
This modeled game is Pareto optimal between the AD (3, 4) and AC (4, 3) 
outcomes. The Nash point is: 3.5, 3.5 which is a points on the Pareto optimal line. 
The Pareto optimal line represents the hypothetical zone for an arbitration 
process. The process of arbitration requires communication, an arbiter and a Nash point 
representing the hypothetically optimal solution. 
3. Analysis of Strategic Moves 
The following analysis examines the case where the players’ strategic moves (first 
move, threat, promise, or combination) result in their achieving the best possible 
                                                 
28 Miroslav Feix, Game Theory: Toolkit and Workbook for Defense Analysis Students.(M.S. thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
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outcomes.  An analysis of strategic moves reveals that POs have a threat, MOs have a 
first move as their most significant strategic move, and neither player has any other 
significant strategic move (promise or combination). 
MO first move: MO wants PO to play A-strategy, and that is why MO moves first 
with C-strategy 
If MO C then PO A with outcome: 4, 3. 
If MO D then PO A with outcome: 3, 4. 
MO can secure likely outcome by making first move D, which is best outcome 3, 
4. 
PO threat: PO wants MO to play C-strategy and that is why PO threatens the 
MO’s D-strategy 
  PO threat to MO’s D-strategy, by playing B-strategy instead of A-strategy, would 
make MO change from D-strategy to C-strategy with outcome: 4, 3. 
Normally, if MO would play D-strategy, then without the use of threat, PO would 
play the A-strategy with outcome: 3, 4. This eliminates AD outcome: 3, 4 and ensures 
BD outcome: 4, 3; which is the most likely outcome if the players play rationally. For the 
purpose of this thesis, playing rationally means trying to achieve the highest possible 
outcome. This outcome would be the best outcome for PO and the second best outcome 
for MO.  
However, interpretation of the outcomes analysis, when combined with 
observations of real practices reveals that players can play rationally or irrationally and 
with pure or mixed strategies.  
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G. INTERPRETATION OF MODELED GAME OUTCOMES  
1. Interpretation of Matrix Analysis 
The matrix analysis of outcomes reveals that the most likely outcome is a 
combination of A-strategy and D-strategy: AD (3, 4). This is supported by the analysis of 
dominant strategy and Nash equilibrium. Practically, this means that the POs would 
initially provide their valuable human resources in order to increase the potential of the 
state to deal with external security threats generated by internal actors.  The MOs would 
initially keep their financial resources because they assume that the POs will provide the 
required human resources even without compensation, or they assume that this 
compensation would come from the state’s budget, giving MOs the best possible 
outcome. This outcome seems mathematically stable, as reflected by the Nash 
equilibrium. Such outcomes of the game also capture common practices of many MWDS.  
However, the stability of the outcome assumes that the prevailing motivation of 
the POs is their common interest in their homeland security over organizational self-
interests (their understanding that external factors generate internal security threats) and 
that the game is played without communication. When the possibility of communication 
is introduced and the sustainability of the prevailing motivation in the common interests 
of POs is questioned, then game analysis provides further possible outcomes as the use of 
strategic moves or mixed strategies is introduced. 
2. Interpretation of Graph Analysis 
The graph analysis reveals that a Pareto optimal line is between point AD, with a 
game value of 3, 4, and point AC, with a game value of 4, 3.  The Pareto optimal 
represents the area in which the arbitration process can most likely come up with 
sustainable solution, a fair and mutually acceptable outcome. This hypothetically optimal 
outcome is represented by the Nash point: 3. 5, 3. 5, which is located on the Pareto 
optimal line.  The Nash point is hypothetical, and, in order to get closer to this outcome, 
it requires compromises by both organizations and probably also the involvement of an 
arbiter. The POs would have to compromise with respect to their expectations of financial 
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compensation for their lost human resources. The MOs would have to compromise with 
respect to sharing their financial resources, educational and training capacities, and their 
command and control monopoly in dealing with external security threats.  
3. Interpretation of the Strategic Moves Analysis  
The analysis of strategic moves reveals that MOs have the first move and POs 
have a credible threat. The MOs would most likely use D-strategy and want POs to use 
A-strategy with a likely outcome of 3, 4, which represents the best possible outcome for 
MOs. This means that MOs resist sharing their financial resources and also resist 
challenges to their monopoly on dealing with external security threats.. MOs rely on the 
prevailing common interest in PO’s motivation to provide their human resources without 
compensation.  If MOs decide to use their first move and use D-strategy, then POs will 
most likely respond with an A-strategy.  This reflects the current situation in which POs 
provide human resources up to a certain level without financial compensation from MOs.  
This most likely scenario, supported by a Nash equilibrium, is problematic insofar 
as POs obviously consider this their second best outcome, based on the assumption that 
their prevailing motivation is the common interest. The POs would obviously rather 
achieve outcome 4, 3, represented by their A-strategy in combination with MOs’ C-
strategy.  This means they provide human resources, but with reasonable compensation 
from the MOs’ budget that allows POs to acquire more human resources. In reality, POs 
do provide some human resources without compensation, but they can give only a limited 
amount. 29 
When POs reach the point when they cannot afford to provide more human 
resources, the most likely scenario is that they will use a threat as their strategic move to 
change the situation. The analysis suggests that their threat should be considered credible. 
It is represented by changing their strategy from A-strategy (provide human resources) to 
B-strategy (resist providing human resources) if the MOs are unwilling to play their C-
                                                 
29 Renata Dwan, Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peacekeeping Operations. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002, 2. 
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strategy (sharing MOs’ financial resources) and insist on playing D-strategy (resisting 
sharing MOs financial resources). The MOs, as a rational players, should recognize the 
threat of POs as credible and change from D-strategy to C-strategy with outcome 4, 3. 
In reality, MOs can decide to ignore or accept the threat of POs and irrationally 
play their D-strategy. The POs in this situation are forced to execute their threat and resist 
providing human resources without compensation; this leads to BD-strategies with 
outcome: 2, 2. This is the second worst possible outcome, which is out of the Pareto 
optimal line, generating a suboptimal outcome.  MOs who keep their financial resources 
would rather “build their own” expeditionary capacities. This is evident in the efforts of 
military police, special operations forces, and other military units that conduct policing or 
train and mentor indigenous police rather than provide their own financial resources to 
compensate for POs losses.  The suboptimal outcome also reflects the questionable 
quality of police capacities generated within MOs and the problem of effectively coping 
with internally generated external security threats. On the other hand, from the POs’ 
perspective, this suboptimal outcome reflects the POs’ problem of coping with externally 
generated internal security threats that are, in such situations, poorly addressed by MOs.  
Renata Dwan refers to this suboptimal outcome in discussing executive policing. 
The personal and financial implications of executive policing for 
international institutions and contributing states are therefore domestic as 
well as international political issues. Only in exceptional, emergency 
situations will states be convinced that it is in their interest to submit their 
own domestic order to further pressure in order to take on the burdens of 
the order of another state. These points to a … key element of the concept 
of executive policing: it is a temporary, short-term measure taken by the 
international community to plug a serious domestic security gap.30 [italics 
added for emphasis] 
Because of the POs’ threat, MOs may decide to (a) provide financial resources (rational 
players’ move with AC-outcome of 4, 3, which is on the Pareto optimal line); or (b) 
arbitrate a solution (rational players move motivated by Nash point with potential 
outcome of 3.5, 3.5); or (c) resist providing their financial resources and build their own 
                                                 
30 Renata Dwan, Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peacekeeping Operations. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002, 2.  
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police expeditionary capacities (with BD-outcome of 2, 2, which is suboptimal). This 
MO move with a suboptimal outcome is discussed by Joseph Celeski. 
Today, the U.S. military could be required to perform policing law-and-
order duties as result of the Pentagon Directive No. 3000, Military Support 
for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, 
dated 28 November 2005. Under the mandates and requirements of 
international law and now within U.S. doctrine, American military forces 
will potentially be organized into constabulary-like units, or may form 
indigenous or irregular constabulary units, within the security line of 
operations.31  
This approach of MOs represents the suboptimal BD-outcome of 2, 2, which is a 
result of the executed threat of POs and the irrational move of MOs. 
However, MOs realize that BD-outcome 2, 2 is suboptimal (as a result of MOs 
irrational move) and that it would be beneficial to begin an arbitration process and try to 
achieve some Pareto optimal outcome, optimally the Nash point. The MOs tendency to 
start an arbitration process is illustrated by a research project conducted by RAND 
Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program, and sponsored by the U.S. 
Army, entitled A Stability Police Force for the United States.32  
H. CONCLUSIONS  
The analysis of the outcomes suggests that there is a hypothetically fair outcome 
represented by a Nash point (with value of the game of 3.5, 3.5). This hypothetical 
outcome indicates the characteristics and requirements of a sustainable organizational 
solution. The characteristics of this solution requires compromises on MO and PO 
interests, falling between their interpretation of the ordinal values of 4 and 3 and 
represented by a Nash point with ordinal value: 3.5. This solution requires starting to 
communicate, and it would involve an arbiter who understands the major sub-state 
stakeholders conflicting interests. 
                                                 
31 Joseph D. Celeski, Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN: the Thick Blue Line. The JSOU Press, 
Hurlburt Field, Florida, 2009.  
32 Terrence K. Kelly et al., A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options 
for creating U.S. Capabilities. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,  
2009),http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG819.pdf (accessed April 28, 2010). 
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The conflicting interests in the case of POs is caused by a lack of human 
resources and the tendency to keep personnel for primary PO tasks focused on internal 
security threats. The MOs want to protect their financial resources and maintain their 
monopoly on dealing with external security threats. The arbiter’s task is to find an 
organizational solution that compromises their organizational-self interests. The MOs 
need to compromise on sharing financial resources, their monopoly status, and the unity 
of command and control over external security threats. The POs need to compromise on 
providing human resources.  
Those suggestions, together with insights gained from observing best 
organizational practices, provide the potential to capture the characteristics of the Nash 
point. They require searching for a solution that involves more than just police and 
military organizations.  An organizational solution limited by two basic options (either 
police or military) would not likely reflect the Nash point (3.5, 3.5) and would likely to 
oscillate between AD-outcome (4, 3) and BD-outcome (2, 2).  This is because the AD-
outcome (4, 3) is so dominant in the case of a low need for police expeditionary 
capacities, and the BD-outcome (2, 2) is such a natural reaction of POs in situations 
where they cannot provide any more resources and MOs play irrationally.  
Observation of best organizational practices suggests considering a third, hybrid 
option. The hybrid organizational solution is based on observations of gendarmerie-type 
organizations. Gendarmerie-type organizations have several characteristics that reflect a 
Nash point in terms of the compromises of MO and PO organizational self-interest; as 
such, it should also inspire the arbiter and major sub-state stakeholders involved in 
reorganizing police expeditionary capacities. The next chapter describes in more detail 
the characteristics of gendarme-type organizations and their relationship to the Nash 
point.   
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V. DISCUSSION 
Chapter V discusses best organizational practices in the context of the outcomes 
and the mathematically captured characteristics of suitable and sustainable organizational 
solutions. The hybrid organizational form is explained, and the example of gendarmerie-
type organizations is presented. The chapter emphasizes the important role of an arbiter 
representing the state level of organization. The collaborative strategy of coping with 
problems is emphasized as a critical factor for overcoming bureaucratic resistance at the 
sub-state level of organization from MOs and POs. As a last section of this chapter is 
presented an international potential for organizing police expeditionary capacities. 
A. BEST OBSERVED ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES:  GENDERMARIE 
TYPE ORGANIZATIONS 
Gendarmeries are a type of organization with several characteristics captured by 
the Nash point in terms of the compromises of MO and PO self-interests.  A hybrid 
organizational solution is a solution between the ideal type police and military solutions, 
according to Derek Lutterbeck.33 In this thesis, the term “hybrid” indicates that the 
gendarmerie-type of organization instantiates a compromise corresponding to the 
numerical solution of 3.5 discussed in Chapter IV, which lies between the ordinal values 
of 3 and 4.  Lutterbeck also refers to “intermediary, gendarmerie-type” or “paramilitary, 
security forces.”  He captures their hybrid character as follows.  
Representing a continuation of military or quasi-military presence in 
domestic security, their existence is of course at odds with one of the basic 
principles — and indeed achievements — of the modern nation-state, at 
least in its liberal-democratic form: the separation between police and 
military. As militarized police forces, they are also often associated with 
authoritarian or repressive tendencies, and are seen as an at least potential 
threat to civil liberties. In the following, however, it is argued that despite, 
or actually because of, their anomalous status, such intermediary forces 
have gained tremendously in importance over recent years. Precisely 
because they combine the characteristics of police and military forces, 
                                                 
33 Derek Lutterbeck, Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of 
Gendarmeries, (Geneva: Sage Journals Online, 2004), http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/39/1/45 (accessed 
April 28, 2010).  
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they have come to play an increasingly salient role in two of the main 
areas of the post-Cold War security agenda: in the field of border control, 
where they are being mobilized to counter various transnational challenges 
to security, and that of peace support operations, where they are seen as an 
increasingly important strategic asset in post-war reconstruction efforts.34 
[italics added for emphasis] 
Gendarmerie type organizations have characteristics that might facilitate the arbitration 
process in terms of their suitability for requirements represented by a Nash point. They 
also represent the organizational form that is more optimal for overcoming organizational 
misfit generated by confronting externally generated internal security threats and 
internally generated external security threats. 
Gendarmerie-type organizations are a solution that lies “between the police and 
military” in terms of their capabilities, status and affiliation with a Ministry of Interior, 
Ministry of Defense, or both. Their most significant characteristic is that their task 
capabilities and missions allow them to conduct a broad spectrum of police duties among 
civilian populations. They thus gain critical experience denied to traditional MOs in 
MWDS. At the same time, these organizations perform tasks that allow them to operate 
in more hostile situations than typical civilian police. Thus, Lutterback writes, 
It is difficult to make generalizations about the typical tasks of such 
gendarmerie-type of paramilitary forces, which may include practically 
any area of internal security or policing. ….. [I]t can be argued that the 
duties of gendarmeries tend to include those types of threats or situations 
which are characterized by a higher degree of hostility or ‘instability’ than 
‘ordinary’ policing usually involves. Dealing with serious internal 
disturbances, riot control or combating terrorism, for instance, are typical 
functions of paramilitary forces. In a sense this too can be seen as a 
reflection of their intermediary status, in that such challenges are often 
considered to call for a more muscled and robust response than ordinary 
(i.e. civilian police) police force are able to provide, but for which the use 
of the regular armed forces is usually not considered appropriate either 
(which is not to say that the latter might not occasionally be deployed for 
such purposes).35  [Italics added for emphasis]  
                                                 
34 Derek Lutterbeck, Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of 
Gendarmeries, (Geneva: Sage Journals Online, 2004), http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/39/1/45 (accessed 
April 28, 2010).  
35 Ibid., 50. 
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Internal security threats generated by external factors are reflected in another typical  
gendarmerie-type mission: border control. Border control includes illegal trafficking, 
illegal immigration, human smuggling and other forms of transnational organized crime 
that require approaches and assets different than those typically provided by civilian 
police. Lutterback says,  
The fact that it is in particular gendarmerie-type as opposed to ‘ordinary’ 
civilian-style police forces that have come to play a predominant role in 
this regard, however, can also be explained in more ‘functional’ or 
operational terms: in particular the task of monitoring green (i.e. land) and 
blue (sea) borders can be said to require heavier equipment than civilian-
style police forces usually have, such as airplanes, helicopters and high-
speed patrol boats. Moreover, given the growing danger and 
professionalism nowadays associated with the transnational crime 
syndicates operating along Europe’s outer rim (as well as along the US–
Mexico border) military-style discipline, organization and equipment are 
seen, at least by these agencies themselves, as essential in providing an 
effective response.36 
In addition, border control and counterterrorism tasks and activities (e.g., French 
GIGN and Spanish GAR) provide gendarmerie-type organizations with capabilities to 
operate in hostile environments. Lutterback writes,  
Typical internal security tasks arising in peace-building missions, such as 
crowd control, combating organized crime, or protecting returnees, of 
course require police skills and equipment – the ultimate objective being 
not to destroy, but rather ‘control’ or neutralize the adversary. On the other 
hand, given the often high level of instability in which such operations 
unfold (due to the absence of functioning state structures), the most robust 
nature gendarmerie or paramilitary forces, and their ability to operate in 
hostile environments is also seen as a crucial asset.37 
Many gendarmerie-type organizations carry a double affiliation or, in 
Lutterback’s words, a “dual dependency” on the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of 
the Interior.38 Their financing may be organized through one or both ministries.  
                                                 
36 Lutterbeck, Derek. Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of 
Gendarmeries, (Geneva: Sage Journals Online, 2004), 62,  http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/39/1/45 
(accessed April 28, 2010), 51. 
37 Ibid., 62. 
38 Ibid., 48. 
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According to Lutterback, with their double affiliation, gendarmeries may be deployed 
under both civilian and military commands, and they are seen as an ideal interface 
between police and military forces in peace support operations.39 For example, the 
Spanish Guardia Civil, while not formally part of the Spanish armed forces, has always 
had a double dependency on the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense.  
Although now headed by a civilian director general, it nevertheless has retained its 
official status as an “armed institution of military nature.”40  This characteristic of the 
hybrid option has the potential to overcome the legal barriers that limit MOs’ ability to 
gain experience by policing in their homeland.  
The POs see gendarmerie-type organizational design as more military, because it 
is more centralized, hierarchical and taller; MOs view it as less military, because it is 
decentralized, smaller and less hierarchical. These categories, and the differences in 
affiliation and capabilities discussed above, would concern any MOs and POs involved in 
arbitrating a new organizational solution for police expeditionary capacities within those 
MWDS that either abolished or never had gendarmerie-type organizations. 
Together, interpretation of the modeled game outcomes analysis and best 
organizational practices suggest extending the decision tree model and adding a solution 
of hybrid solutions (HOs) as a state’s third option. This modifies the originally introduced 








                                                 
39 Derek Lutterbeck, Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of 
Gendarmeries, (Geneva: Sage Journals Online, 2004),62,  http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/39/1/45 
(accessed April 28, 2010), 58. 
40 Ibid, 49. 
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Figure 5.   A modified decision tree as viewed from the state’s perspective 
In practice, the inclusion of a third hybrid option in the decision-making process might be 
more difficult than it appears, for at least two reasons.  First, none of the parties involved 
(the state, MOs, or POs) can easily see and include the hybrid option in the decision-
making process because of the decision trap of frame blindness.41 Frame blindness is 
described as, “Setting out to solve the wrong problem because you have created a mental 
framework for your decision, with little thought, that causes you to overlook the best 
options or lose sight important objectives.”42 Looking for an organizational solution that 
is strictly police or military might reflect the limits of such mental frameworks. 
Furthermore, in some cases ignoring the hybrid solution results from the 
conscious processes revealed in a typical example observed by Celeski in the U.S. 
What is clear…from recent high level war-gaming and doctrinal reviews 
of Joint warfighter tasks required in COIN environments, is that little 
support exists for the creation of a standing U.S. constabulary 
organization; it is not currently needed. However, initial experiences as 
occupation forces in Iraq should not restrict considerations on what may 
be required in future conflicts.43  
 
                                                 
41 Edward J. Russo and Paul J.H. Shoemaker, Decision Traps: Ten  Barriers to Brilliant Decision-
Making and How to Overcome Them, Doubleday, New York, 1989, 16. 
42 Ibid., 16. 
43 Joseph D. Celeski, Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN: the Thick Blue Line. The JSOU Press, 
Hurlburt Field, Florida, 2009. 46. 
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The opinion of “high level” military circles represents a problematic BD-outcome (2, 2) 
of the modeled game, which reflects the essence of the dilemma between the common 
and organizational self-interests described previously. Those in “high level” police circles 
also have little interest in organizing police expeditionary capacities.  This is supported 
by the most significant U.S. study on the topic,  a 2009 Rand Corporation study 
developed at the request of the Department of the Army (MOs) rather than by POs.44 
Such activity suggests that MOs might have begun to realize that in terms of the modeled 
game, they have ended up with their second worst outcome, represented by BD strategies 
(2, 2).  They initiate the process of arbitration in order to achieve better outcomes and 
values of the game.  This is optimally as close as possible to the Nash point (3.5, 3.5).  
The implementation of the hybrid option within the state decision-making process 
is also affected by the fact that this option might be viewed as an anomaly. As Lutterback 
says,  
While such intermediary forces are typically viewed as an anachronism or 
anomaly, and – because of their ambiguous status – have generally not 
received much attention in the literature, they have come to play an 
increasingly significant role in two major areas of the contemporary 
security agenda: that of border control and that of peace support 
operations.”45   
This would seem to constitute a wicked problem; the MOs’ and POs’ different 
frames of reference lead to disagreement on how the problem should be addressed and 
solved.   
The process of organizing police expeditionary capacities of MWDS should 
reflect the role of the ongoing dynamics between major sub-state stakeholders (MOs and 
POs) and particularly the importance of their organizational self-interests. The differing  
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45 Derek Lutterbeck, Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of 
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frames and organizational self-interest of experts within MOs and POs affect their own 
reports and judgments of the validity of such reports. Again, this qualifies as a wicked 
problem. 
The hybrid option appears to have the potential to capture the characteristics of 
the Nash point better than either police or military organizational solutions. In addition to 
the perspective of individual MWDS, there is also an international perspective on how to 
organize those missing capacities, discussed in the following section. 
B. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
There is significant potential in the international context for organizing police 
expeditionary capacities. In particular, NATO and its principles of collective defense 
provide an opportunity to coordinate the process of building a force structure based on 
the specifics of individual member states. Some European countries (e.g., France, Italy 
and Spain) did not abolish the hybrid organizations that enable them to contribute to the 
collective defense with the required capabilities.  
One practical example of international activity in this field is an initiative by  
several EU member states, the European Gendarmerie Force.  
The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) is an initiative of 5 EU Member 
States—France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain—aimed at 
improving the crisis management capability in sensitive areas…. EGF 
responds to the need to rapidly conduct all the spectrum of civil security 
actions, either on its own or in parallel with the military intervention, by 
providing a multinational and effective tool. The EGF will facilitate the 
handling of crises that require management by police forces, usually in a 
critical situation, also taking advantage from the experience already gained 
in the relevant peace-keeping missions. ….. EGF goal is to provide the 
International Community with a valid and operational instrument for crisis 
management, first and foremost at disposal of EU, but also of other 
International Organizations, [such] as NATO, UN and OSCE, and ad hoc 
coalitions.46 
 
                                                 
46 Euro gendarmes Web sites. http://www.eurogendfor.org/Default.aspx (accessed April 28, 2010). 
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 Potential also lies in small NATO member states with little capacity for 
conventional warfare and states with a demonstrated lack of political support for combat 
operations. Such states might see reorganizing in terms of police expeditionary capacities 
as an opportunity to contribute in mutually convenient ways and thus avert being seen as 
“free riders” on NATO’s collective defense. Gendarmerie-type organizations would also 
be better suited to deal with externally generated internal security threats such as border 
control, illegal trafficking, and riots and civil disturbances in general, as well as those 
caused by groups of immigrants. Lutterbeck writes, 
It suffices to note that among security analysts there now seems to be 
relatively broad agreement that the main security risks facing the countries 
of the Euro-Atlantic area since the end of bipolarity, apart from threats 
posed by so-called rogue states (armed with weapons of mass destruction), 
are no longer state-based and military but rather non-state and 
transnational, consisting in various illicit or uncontrolled cross-border 
phenomena at the sub-state level. At the top of the ‘new security agenda’ 
one typically finds issues such as drug trafficking, trafficking in hazardous 
substances, irregular immigration, human smuggling as well as other 
forms of transnational organized crime — all phenomena which are seen 
as having gained in salience and momentum due to deepening 
interdependence and rapid advances in communication and transportation 
technologies…47  
Gendarmerie-type organizations to deal with externally generated internal security threats 
would also be more motivated to provide their capacities to deal with these threats. This 
assumes that such organizations would understand how these new threats relate to one 
another. This further suggests that there is a higher probability that a hybrid organization 
would be motivated to exercise its capacities overseas and that these capacities will be 
used within the state when they are not needed elsewhere. 
Due to the wickedness of this problem territory, the role of an independent arbiter 
is crucial. In particular, starting negotiations between representatives of major sub-state 
stakeholders would require the initiative of an arbiter authorized to get the MOs and POs 
involved in the process. Neither MOs nor POs would be inspired to initiate and undergo 
                                                 
47 Derek Lutterbeck, Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of 
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the process of arbitration based on the hybrid option’s promising potential, because they 
still operate with organizational self-interest and possibly frame blindness as well. This 
suggests that the arbiter should be not represent the sub-state organizational level (MOs 
and POs) but rather the state level (president or prime minister level).  It also suggests 
that the process should be initiated from that level.  
The role of an independent arbiter and the importance of initiating discussion of 
stakeholders’ viewpoints is supported by a recommended strategy for coping with wicked 
problems—the collaborative strategy. Roberts says that collaboration is based on the 
principle that in joining forces, parties can accomplish more collectively than as 
independent agents.  The  core of collaboration, he says, is a “win-win” view of problem 
solving.48 This underlines the role of the state as an involved stakeholder with the 
authority to bring both sub-state stakeholders to the negotiation table and to implement a 
collaborative strategy for dealing with this wicked problem. 
The hybrid option seems more likely to capture the characteristics of a Nash point 
than either police or military organizational solutions. Changes in the organization of 
police expeditionary capacities should be initiated and executed at the state level. In 
addition, the international perspective has the promising potential to organize these 
capacities on the international level.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 
This thesis proposes a mathematical modeling approach to the domain of strategic 
decision-making processes in organizing police expeditionary capacities. It argues that a 
new security paradigm has been generated by processes of globalization in which internal 
security threats depend on external factors (transnational terrorism and serious organized 
crime) and external security threats depend on internal factors (non-state actors). This 
new security paradigm calls for reorganizing MWDS’s current police expeditionary 
capacities and building new ones. It also argues that the traditional way of organizing 
such capacities within either police or military organizations provides only an 
inappropriate, limited and unsustainable organizational solution.  
The main conclusion of this thesis is the suggestion that decision makers consider 
a hybrid organizational option as mathematically the most likely sustainable outcome 
(organizational solution) for police expeditionary capacities within MWDSs. This means 
that decision makers should assess not only the organizational options of POs and MOs, 
but also a hybrid option represented most typically by gendarmerie-type organizations. 
This thesis does not assess these three options.  Such assessment must be done with 
attention to the specific circumstances of each MWDS; this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Rather, this thesis emphasizes the importance of the hybrid option as potentially 
enabling and incentivizing inspirational organizational practice. The thesis explains why 
this is so by interpreting the analysis of modeled game’s outcomes.   
The mathematical modeling in the thesis is based on the author’s judgments.  It is 
thus recommended that further mathematical modeling include such specifics as 
individual states’ historical traditions, public opinion, current organizational practices, 
legal constraints, and degrees of cooperation versus competition between MOs and POs. 
A deeper examination of each state’s police and existing or potential hybrid organizations 
will provide better inputs to the mathematical model and increase the validity of the 
outputs.  
 56
The process of organizing MWDS’s police expeditionary capacities should reflect 
the ongoing dynamics between major sub-state stakeholders and the conflict between 
common and organizational self-interests. In the current climate, the validity of reports by 
experts may well be affected by these complicated dynamics. This is one reason why the 
methods used in this thesis might be a tool against the decision trap of frame blindness.49 
The method also contributes to better problem identification within the wicked problem 
territory. The fact that major sub-state stakeholders do not agree on whether there is a 
problem, how to specify the problem and how to solve it supports the claim that 
organizing police expeditionary capacities is in the wicked problem category. The thesis 
emphasizes the role of an independent arbiter representing the state level, because simply 
presenting the potential of a hybrid option is unlikely to change the bureaucratic 
resistance of MOs and POs. 
This thesis is also a response to the topics of interest announced by Special 
Operations Command, and specifically to SOCOM interest in the use of mathematical 
modeling to study of interagency cooperation. The author hopes that it contributes 
insights on the problem territory connected with population-centric operations. The 
analytic techniques and game analysis used in this thesis can provide SOCOM with an 
approach to assessing the organizational aspects of missing police capabilities.  The 
thesis demonstrates how these methods can reveal important dynamics between major 
sub-state stakeholders that determine potential barriers and failures of the process. The 
interpretation of these dynamics in terms of gendarmerie-type organizations illustrates 
how these methods can complement and integrate with other analyses.   
 
                                                 
49 Edward J. Russo and Paul J.H. Shoemaker, Decision Traps: Ten Barriers to Brilliant Decision-
Making and How to Overcome Them, Doubleday, New York, 1989, 16. 
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